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ARTICLE 
EXPLOITATION OF THE ELITE: A CASE FOR 
PHYSICIAN UNIONIZATION 
DIONNE KOLLER FINE* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A physician shall be dedicated to providing competent medical service with 
compassion and respect for human dignity.1 
 
This first principle of medical ethics sounds deceptively simple.  The 
complexities are apparent, however, when this and other principles of medical 
ethics work in a system of managed health care.  Under managed care, the 
issue is usually the cost of “compassionate” and “competent” medical care and 
not the care itself.  This presents a difficult dilemma for physicians.2  As one 
commentator has stated: 
[P]oliticians attempting to reform the health care system have promised that 
they will meet the contradictory goals of containing health care costs and 
increasing the number of people with adequate health care coverage.  
 
* Assistant Dean for Student Affairs and Professorial Lecturer in Law, The George Washington 
University Law School.  Special thanks to Steven Schooner and Andrew Altman for their helpful 
comments and support.  Thanks also to my research assistants, Jennifer Kantor and Rachel Zakar. 
 1. American Medical Association Policy Finder, E-Principles of Medical Ethics (Sept. 19, 
2000), available at http://www.ama-assn.org. 
 2. See Pegram v. Herdrich, 120 S. Ct. 2143 (2000).  “[I]n an HMO system, a physician’s 
financial interest lies in providing less care, not more.  The check on this influence (like that on 
the converse, fee-for-service incentive) is the professional obligation to provide covered services 
with a reasonable degree of skill and judgment in the patient’s interest.” Id. at 2149 (citation 
omitted). 
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Meanwhile, pre-paid health plans proliferate, advertising low costs and 
seemingly unrestricted benefits to prospective patients.  Neither group wants to 
acknowledge the need to ration care.  Thus, the easiest solution may be for 
politicians and third-party payers to avoid explicit acknowledgment of the need 
to ration, while creating policies that implicitly require physicians to ration at 
the bedside.3 
This pressure from the government and managed care organizations 
(“MCOs”) to “ration at the bedside” and consider cost as a component of care 
has serious implications for patients.  Not surprisingly, the effects of cost-
conscious utilization review led to a “managed care backlash,”4 prompting 
policy makers to propose numerous “patients’ rights” reforms seemingly 
designed to guarantee that patients can still have their health care like the old 
fee-for-service days, but maintain the cost-cutting that managed care seeks to 
deliver.5  One of these proposals, the Quality Health Care Coalition Act (“the 
Health Care Act”),6 emerged recently as a potential solution to the perceived 
problem of MCOs putting cost before patient care.7  The Health Care Act 
would give physicians greater negotiating power against MCOs by allowing 
them to bargain collectively.8  Many physicians as well as the American 
Medical Association (“AMA”) support the proposal.9 
One would expect physicians to support the Health Care Act based on 
managed care’s profound effects on their practices.  Long considered wealthy 
elites, physicians have not captured the sympathy of politicians or the 
American public in the managed care debate.  Yet managed care’s effects on 
them are no less significant than the effects of managed care on patients.  
Indeed, the lower reimbursements, which are a key part of managed care, have 
caused some physicians’ practices to go bankrupt and have even driven some 
 
 3. Peter A. Ubel, M.D. & Robert M. Arnold, M.D., The Unbearable Rightness of Bedside 
Rationing: Physician Duties in a Climate of Cost Containment, in THREE REALMS OF MANAGED 
CARE, SOCIETAL, INSTITUTIONAL, INDIVIDUAL 170 (John W. Glaser & Ronald P. Hamel eds., 
1997). 
 4. See David A. Hyman, Managed Care at the Millennium: Scenes from a Maul, 24 J. 
HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 1061, 1061-62 (1999) [hereinafter Hyman, Managed Care at the 
Millennium]. 
 5. Id. 
 6. H.R. 1304, 106th Cong. (1999).  The measure was passed recently by the House and 
awaits action in the Senate. 
 7. See id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. See Statement of the American Medical Association to Congress, Testimony in Support 
of H.R. 1304, the Quality Health Care Coalition Act of 1999, 106th Cong. 1 (June 22, 1999) 
(statement of E. Radcliffe Anderson, Jr., M.D., Executive Vice President and Chief Executive 
Officer of the AMA) [hereinafter AMA Statement], at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/basic/article/ 
0%2C1059%2C177-461-1%2C00.html. 
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physicians to leave the practice of medicine.10  Further, many of our best and 
brightest may no longer be selecting a career in medicine.11  Yet physicians 
largely do not support the unionization proposal on this basis.  At the center of 
physicians’ argument for collective bargaining rights is that such a step is 
necessary to ensure quality patient care.12 
Opponents of unionization argue that allowing physicians to bargain 
collectively will not improve patient care, but will simply raise physicians’ 
salaries and further compound the health care crisis.13  The likelihood that 
either of these competing claims is true will not be examined here.  Instead, 
this essay examines the physician unionization debate from the perspective of 
physicians as opposed to patients.  Unlike a traditional worker seeking 
unionization, physicians, at least openly, do not argue that unionization is 
warranted because MCOs are exploiting them.  This essay, however, assumes 
that they do for purposes of exploring whether such a claim might be 
warranted.  The vehicle for this exercise is a hypothetical “moral motion to 
dismiss.”14  That is, taking physicians’ arguments against managed care to be 
true, do they state a moral claim for collective bargaining rights?  I assert that 
they do. 
First, managed care has had a profound, negative effect on physicians’ 
salaries and working conditions.  Second, physicians are hesitant and in some 
cases unable to advocate on their own behalf.  Third, the “free market” for 
health care, which government and MCOs purport to promote, is not so free at 
all.  Taken together, these points illustrate that MCOs, in some cases, may have 
an unfair advantage over physicians, which MCOs are able to use to their 
significant benefit.  Accordingly, physicians legitimately can make the claim 
that MCOs, with the support of corporations and the federal government, are to 
some degree exploiting them.  Thus, physicians’ argument for an antitrust 
exemption to allow them to bargain collectively has some moral basis, and 
should not be brushed aside as simply an attempt by wealthy elites to protect 
their position.  While it may be that some exploitation of physicians is 
necessary and can be justified as being for the “greater good” of solving our 
health care crisis, in the long run, society will only benefit from seriously 
considering the impact health reform has on physicians. 
 
 10. Anne Barnard & Kathryn Tong, The Doctor is Out: More and More Physicians, 
Frustrated with Managed Care, Are Trying New Professions and Finding Life Less Stressful, 
BOSTON GLOBE, July 9, 2000, at A1. 
 11. See Daniel S. Greenberg, USA’s Changing Environment of Medical School Enrollments, 
352 LANCET 1531, 1531 (1998). 
 12. See infra text accompanying notes 76-81. 
 13. See infra text accompanying notes 82-94. 
 14. See WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 1357 (1990) (“[F]or 
purposes of the motion to dismiss, the complaint is construed in the light most favorable to 
plaintiff and its allegations are taken as true.”). 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. What is Managed Care? 
Before explaining managed care’s effects on physicians, it is important to 
explain the managed care system.  The managed care system gained popularity 
as a way to curb steadily rising healthcare costs.15  Thus, it is “a collective 
response on the part of both public and private payers to mounting evidence of 
out-of-control health care costs which threatened the future of health 
insurance . . . .”16  Employers concerned about the costs of employee health 
benefits are key supporters of managed care, as they believe it will help reduce 
health care costs and make providers more accountable.17  The government is 
also an important player in the success of managed care, through legislation18 
and in its role as a purchaser of health care services through the Medicare and 
Medicaid programs.  Thus, it has been stated that “[c]ost reduction, not quality 
improvement, was the predominant motivation for the switch to managed 
care.”19  This focus on cost is significant not simply for employers looking to 
reduce health benefit expenditures, but for physicians as well.  Before managed 
care, it was the physician who was “the locus and determinant of quality.”20  
Traditionally, cost was not a concern in the treatment decision.21 
The managed care system emphasizes the cost of health care services and 
attempts to control these costs through a variety of different techniques.  In 
general, managed care is: 
[A]ny health coverage arrangement in which, for a pre-set fee (i.e., the 
premium), a company sells a defined package of benefits to a purchaser, with 
services furnished to enrolled members through a network of participating 
providers who operate under written contractual or employment agreements, 
and whose selection and authority to furnish covered benefits is controlled by 
the managed care company.22 
 
 15. DENNIS A. ROBBINS, INTEGRATING MANAGED CARE AND ETHICS: TRANSFORMING 
CHALLENGES INTO POSITIVE OUTCOMES 5 (1998). 
 16. RAND E. ROSENBLATT ET AL., LAW AND THE AMERICAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 546 
(1997). 
 17. ROBBINS, supra note 15, at 5. 
 18. See, e.g., Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-222, 87 Stat. 
914 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 19. ROBBINS, supra note 15, at 3. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. ROSENBLATT, supra note 16, at 551-52; see also KENNETH R. WING ET AL., THE LAW 
AND AMERICAN HEALTH CARE 84 (1998) (The term managed care “can be used to include 
virtually any financing arrangement where there is third-party management or supervision that 
attempts in some structured way to oversee quality and, particularly, the costs of services 
delivered to the plan’s beneficiaries.”). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2001] EXPLOITATION OF THE ELITE 211 
The “control” exercised by MCOs is in the form of “supply- and demand-side 
strategies to force patients and providers to consider the marginal costs in 
making health care consumption decisions.”23  Courts have noted that in this 
role, MCOs can wear two hats: providing administrative support for an 
insurance plan, including making determinations of eligibility or coverage, and 
acting “as an arranger and provider of medical treatment.”24  For instance, 
MCOs often require pre-authorization for certain services, restrict access to 
specialists, deny payment for services provided outside the “network,” require 
co-payments, pay physicians on a capitated basis or offer bonuses tied to 
certain utilization levels and restrict coverage of prescription drugs, among 
other things.25  In short, MCOs enforce utilization management by controlling 
physicians’ behavior.26  It is these types of controls that have led to the 
“managed care backlash” and concern over its effects on patients.27  As 
mentioned above, however, the tools of managed care also have a significant 
impact on physicians. 
B. Managed Care’s Effects on Physicians 
In evaluating the “claim” physicians might make against MCOs and 
whether it would survive a “moral motion to dismiss,” we must first determine 
the basis of the claim.  A moral claim by physicians is derived from managed 
care’s effects on their professional obligations, working conditions and 
incomes.  In general, physicians feel a loss of control over their practices.28  
Many physicians feel that the utilization management undertaken by MCOs is 
“oppressive” and unduly interferes with the physician-patient relationship by, 
for instance, limiting the diagnostic tests and prescription drugs they may order 
and limiting referrals to specialists and the emergency room.29  As one 
commentator explained: 
This trend toward corporate control is eroding the foundation of the physician-
patient relationship.  This erosion is primarily caused by managed health care 
plans exercising a significant amount of economic leverage over physicians.  
This leverage enables health plan providers to assume substantial control over 
 
 23. David A. Hyman, Regulating Managed Care: What’s Wrong with a Patient Bill of 
Rights, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 221, 229 (2000) [hereinafter Hyman, Regulating Managed Care]. 
 24. Corp. Health Ins. v. Texas Dep’t of Ins., 215 F.3d 526, 534 (5th Cir. 2000). 
 25. Hyman, Regulating Managed Care, supra note 23, at 229. 
 26. John J. Deis, The Unionization of Independent Contracting Physicians: A Comedy of 
Errors, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 951, 954 (1999). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Chris Phan, Physician Unionization: The Impact On the Medical Profession, 20 J. 
LEGAL MED. 115, 116 (1999). 
 29. Ellen L. Luepke, White Coat, Blue Collar: Physician Unionization and Managed Care, 8 
ANNALS HEALTH L. 275, 277 (1999); Phan, supra note 28, at 117.  As stated above, it is the 
effects of utilization review on patients which dominates policy debates over managed care. 
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patient medical decision-making, drive down physician incomes, and threaten 
the viability of some physicians’ practices.30 
In their article Managed Care and the Physician’s Marketplace, Carol J. 
Simon, William D. White, Patricia Born and David Dranvoe recently noted 
that “[u]nder managed care the locus of decision making about where care is 
received and what care is obtained is shifted from individual patients and their 
physicians towards insurers and employers.”31  Moreover, beyond simple 
frustration with MCO oversight, many physicians have ethical objections to the 
financial incentives used by MCOs to encourage physicians to limit care.32 
The challenge to physicians’ autonomy in clinical decision making in 
many respects is more difficult for physicians than decreased salary.  
Historically, physicians have enjoyed what Magali Sarfatti Larson calls a 
“monopoly of competence” supported by state licensing requirements and a 
“monopoly of credibility with the public.”33  According to Larson, this 
monopoly of competence is important because “it restricts the control by 
outside agencies over the actual ethicality of the transaction of professional 
services.”34  In the view of physicians, however, managed care has invaded this 
previously restricted zone.  As one recent study noted, more than one-third of 
surveyed physicians characterized their morale as low and nearly one-half 
stated that they often think about leaving medicine.35  Some physicians feel 
that they are under siege.36 
The economic effects of managed care on physicians are also significant.  
While in 1986, only forty-three percent of physicians participated with a 
managed care plan, by 1995, that figure had risen to eighty-three percent.  This 
participation often puts physicians at financial risk.37  In 1994, physician 
income dropped 3.8%.38  This trend continues.39  Indeed, in a recent article, 
 
 30. Phan, supra note 28, at 117 (footnote omitted). 
 31. Carol J. Simon et al., Managed Care and the Physician Marketplace, in MANAGED 
CARE AND CHANGING HEALTH CARE MARKETS 96 (Michael A. Morrisey ed., 1998). 
 32. See Daniel P. Sulmasy, O.F.M., M.D., Ph.D., et al., Physicians’ Ethical Beliefs About 
Cost-Control Arrangements,160 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 649 (2000). 
 33. MAGALI SARFATTI LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL 
ANALYSIS 38 (1977). 
 34. Id. 
 35. Most Doctors Oppose Managed-Care Hassles, MODERN HEALTHCARE, Sept. 21, 1998, 
at 38. 
 36. Joseph Bernstein, M.D., M.S., Topics in Medical Economics: Lessons of the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma, 82-A J. BONE & JOINT SURGERY 595, 595 (2000). 
 37. Fred J. Hellinger, The Impact of Financial Incentives on Physician Behavior in Managed 
Care Plans: A Review of the Evidence, 53 MED. CARE RES. REV. 294, 295 (1996). 
 38. WILLIAM J. CURRAN ET AL., HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHICS 73 (1998). 
 39. See Vitals, MODERN PHYSICIAN (June 1, 1999), at http://www.modernphysician.com/ 
archive/article.php3?refid=1000 (“Median net income for doctors dropped for the fourth 
consecutive year in 1997, according to the American Medical Association.”); see also Anita J. 
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Daniel R. Roach states that “providers are fighting for their lives.”40  
Physicians who are now forced to participate with MCOs face “deselection” 
(termination from the plan) if they do not contain health care costs in line with 
MCOs market-driven strategy.41  This termination is made even swifter 
because MCOs commonly include termination-without-cause provisions in 
their contracts. 42  Some plans even include indemnification provisions as part 
of their contracts, which shift liability and hold the plan harmless for its acts.43  
In describing providers’ inability to comply with burdensome federal Medicare 
regulations, Roach cites their lack of resources.  He states: 
Physicians are . . . extraordinarily frustrated with the current state of affairs as 
their incomes are plummet[ing] and their job satisfaction declines.  In 
California, 115 physician groups have either declared bankruptcy or gone out 
of business in the last three years.  An estimated eighty-five percent are in 
serious financial trouble.44 
The effects of managed care on physicians are trickling down to impact 
medical students, and even students considering careers in medicine.45 
Physicians’ reactions to managed care largely have been dismissed as the 
inevitable anger over loss of professional dominance, income and prestige.  
One commentator recently remarked that “[i]t has been said that a good drama 
requires victims, villains, and heroes.  If so, the managed care backlash has 
been a most excellent drama, with . . . providers playing the victims . . . .”46  
Such a view, however, fails to consider the level of commitment most 
physicians have to serving their patients, the training involved in becoming a 
physician and the extraordinary responsibilities a practicing physician 
undertakes.47  As stated by Larson: “[I]n a secularized society, medicine serves 
most directly the ‘sacred’ value of life.”48  She further notes that “of all the 
 
Slomski, How Much are Groups Paying Their Doctors?, MED. ECON., Jan. 10, 2000, at 115, 119 
(“Specialists will see their salaries decrease as they reach their workweek limit.”). 
 40. Daniel R. Roach & Cori MacDonneil, The Compliance Conundrum, 32 J. HEALTH & 
HOSP. L. 565, 568 (1999). 
 41. Richard S. Liner, Physician Deselection: The Dynamics of a New Threat to the 
Physician-Patient Relationship, 23 AM. J. L. & MED. 511, 512-13 (1997). 
 42. Id. 
 43. See Corp. Health Ins. v. Texas Dept. of Ins., 215 F.3d 526 (5th Cir. 2000).  Several states 
have passed legislation to protect physicians from retaliatory deselection and the indemnification 
provisions commonly found in MCO-physician contracts.  A Texas statute recently was upheld 
against an MCO challenge that it was preempted by ERISA.  Id. at 536-37. 
 44. Roach, supra note 40, at 568. 
 45. Greenberg, supra note 11, at 1531. 
 46. Hyman, Managed Care at the Millenium, supra note 4, at 1068. 
 47. See Phan, supra note 28, at 116 (“Physicians, on the whole, have the longest educational 
and specialty training path of any professional.”). 
 48. LARSON, supra note 33, at 38-39. 
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professions, it appears to have the strongest claims to an ideal of service and 
devotion to human welfare.”49 
C. The Current Legal Climate—Antitrust and Labor Laws 
Most physicians are unable to take collective action to counteract the 
effects of managed care.  Physician unionization is prohibited by the antitrust 
laws, which apply to collective action by sellers or purchasers of goods and 
services to restrain trade through such means as, for instance, price fixing.50  
Specifically, the Sherman Act “seeks to safeguard competition by assuring that 
market participants do not injure consumers by making agreements that 
illegally restrain trade.”51  The Clayton Act, on the other hand, provides an 
exemption to the antitrust laws by allowing labor unions to collectively bargain 
on behalf of their members.52  The National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) 
builds on the Clayton Act by further defining the labor exemption from the 
antitrust laws and establishing the National Labor Relations Board.53 
Physicians who are employed by the federal government, hospitals or 
health maintenance organizations, for example, are covered by the Clayton Act 
and therefore, in general, are permitted to bargain collectively.54  Employed 
physicians have had difficulty organizing, however, in that they are frequently 
considered to be independent contractors or supervisory employees and are, 
thus, exempt from the NLRA.55  Approximately fifteen percent of all patient 
care physicians are employed and eligible to join unions.56  It is the remaining 
majority of physicians, those in private practice, to whom federal physician 
unionization legislation would apply. 
III. THE UNIONIZATION PROPOSAL 
A. The Quality Health Care Coalition Act 
Originally introduced by Representative Tom Campbell (R-Ca.), along 
with over one hundred co-sponsors, the Health Care Act’s stated purpose is to 
ensure and foster continued patient safety and quality of care by making the 
antitrust laws apply to negotiations between groups of health care professionals 
and health plans and health insurance issuers in the same manner as such laws 
 
 49. Id. 
 50. See Edward B. Hirshfeld, Physicians, Unions, and Antitrust, 32 J. HEALTH L. 43 (1999). 
 51. Luepke, supra note 29, at 282. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Hirshfeld, supra note 50, at 51. 
 55. Luepke, supra note 29, at 282-83. 
 56. Julie Rovner, USA Takes First Steps to a Doctors’ Union, 354 LANCET 54 (1999). 
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apply to collective bargaining by labor organizations under the National Labor 
Relations Act.57 
Thus, the bill’s main provision states: 
Any health care professionals who are engaged in negotiations with a health 
plan regarding the terms of any contract under which the professionals provide 
health care items or services . . . shall, in connection with such negotiations, be 
entitled to the same treatment under the antitrust laws as the treatment to which 
bargaining units recognized under the National Labor Relations Act are 
entitled in connection to such collective bargaining.  Such a professional shall, 
only in connection with such negotiations, be treated as an employee engaged 
in concerted activities and shall not be regarded as having the status of an 
employer, independent contractor, managerial employee, or supervisor.58 
Significantly, the proposed legislation does not provide physicians with the 
right to go on strike and stop treating patients.  Moreover, the statute would not 
apply to negotiations pertaining to federal programs such as Medicare and 
Medicaid.  The proposed legislation also includes a three-year sunset 
provision. 
Shortly after it was introduced, the AMA voted to endorse unionization to 
“give America’s physicians the leverage they now lack to guarantee that 
patient care is not compromised or neglected for the sake of profits.”59  Since 
that time, there has been considerable movement on the state level, with 
seventeen states considering collective negotiation bills.60  Only the District of 
Columbia bill has passed, however, and that measure currently awaits 
Congressional approval.61  Texas is the only state with a collective bargaining 
statute in effect.62  The Texas statute is instructive.  In its “Findings and 
Purposes,” the legislature stated: 
Although the legislature finds that joint negotiations over fee-related terms 
may in some circumstances yield anti-competitive effects, it also recognizes 
that there are instances in which health plans dominate the market to such a 
degree that fair negotiations between physicians and the plan are unobtainable 
absent any joint action on behalf of physicians.  In these instances, health plans 
have the ability to virtually dictate the terms of the contracts they offer 
physicians.63 
The statute authorizes physicians to jointly negotiate with health plans in all 
instances with respect to certain terms, such as “practices and procedures” for 
 
 57. The Quality Health Care Coalition Act of 1999, H.R. 13041, 106th Cong. (1999). 
 58. Id. 
 59. Rovner, supra note 56, at 54 (quoting AMA Board Chairman Randolph Smoak, M.D.). 
 60. Leigh Page, State Legislatures Cool to Collective Negotiation Bills, AM. MED. NEWS 
(June 26, 2000), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/sci-pubs/amnews/pick_00/gvsa0626.html. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 29.01 (Vernon 2000) (emphasis added). 
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improving the delivery of health care.64  Unlike the proposed federal 
legislation, the Texas statute provides that collective negotiation is not 
permitted with respect to fees, unless the attorney general makes a 
determination that the health plan has “substantial market power.”65  The 
statute is effective until September 1, 2003.66 
B. The Unionization Debate 
In evaluating physicians’ hypothetical claim,67 it also is helpful to examine 
the unionization debate itself.  The arguments that are made, and those that are 
not made, for and against the unionization proposal, shed important light on 
physicians’ role in our drive to reform health care.  An analysis of the debate 
provides support for a claim that physicians are to some degree being 
exploited. 
1. Arguments for the Legislation 
One might expect physicians to support the Health Care Act on the basis 
that managed care has had a dramatic effect on their salaries, working 
conditions and the very essence of their “physicianhood.”  Yet arguments for 
legislation center not on this point, but on harm to patients.  Advocates argue 
that the “tremendous control” MCOs exert over physicians has “adverse 
effects” on patient care.68  During hearings on the Health Care Act, William 
W. Tipton, Jr., M.D., speaking on behalf of the American Association of 
Orthopedic Surgeons, stated that the problem, in many ways, lies in the ever-
increasing consolidation of the health insurance industry.69  Dr. Tipton stated: 
[T]hrough consolidation, health plans not only gain market power, but 
economic strength as well.  As a result, they have been able to join together, 
not to negotiate or discuss contracts with physicians, but to dictate the terms of 
their contracts on a “take it or leave it” basis.  They have been able to impose 
 
 64. Id. art. 29.04. 
 65. Id. art. 29.06(a). 
 66. Id. art. 29.01. 
 67. It is beyond the scope of this paper to analyze whether physician unionization is 
generally “good policy.”  Whereas physician unionization might not be good policy for ensuring 
quality patient care, as opponents to the legislation argue, it might be very effective in restoring 
physicians’ autonomy over treatment decisions and guaranteeing what physicians regard as a fair 
level of compensation.  This paper does not resolve these issues. 
 68. Statement of the American Association of Orthopedic Surgeons on the Quality Health 
Care Coalition Act of 1999 before the House Judiciary Comm.: Hearing on H.R. 1304 Before the 
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 1 (1999) (statement of William W. Tipton, Jr., M.D., 
Executive Vice-President of the American Association of Orthopedic Surgeons) [hereinafter 
Tipton Statement]. 
 69. Id. 
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contract terms, which often are not in the best interest of patients, in order to 
maximize their profits and minimize their patient care responsibilities.70 
Dr. Tipton went on to explain that many of these “take-it-or-leave-it” contracts 
restrict the ability of patients to receive necessary care by giving the plans veto 
power over physicians’ medical decisions,71 restricting referrals to specialists 
and imposing burdensome administrative requirements that act to delay care.72  
Dr. Tipton also noted that many health plan contracts contain “hold harmless” 
clauses, which give plans malpractice immunity and shift liability completely 
to the physician even though the plan may have dictated the treatment 
decision.73  Dr. Tipton concluded by arguing that passage of the Health Care 
Act would give physicians the power to have input into “how health care is 
delivered in this new era of managed care.”74  This power, he argues, “will 
help restore the role of physicians as the patient’s best advocate.”75 
The AMA, in its statement on the Health Care Act, also stressed that the 
legislation was needed to ensure quality patient care.76  The AMA went into 
great detail about the consolidation of the health care industry and how this 
type of market concentration is harmful to patients.  The AMA stated that the 
Aetna/U.S. Healthcare plan had “dangerous levels of control” in several 
states.77  The AMA stated that since 1996, Aetna has acquired not only U.S. 
Healthcare, but also NYL Care and has announced its intention to purchase 
Prudential, resulting in Aetna having 22.4  million covered lives.78  The AMA 
argued that “Aetna’s extremely aggressive and anti-patient business 
practices . . . actually work to significantly increase its market power.  Aetna’s 
growth and profitability is not about popularity and success as a result of high 
quality health care, it’s about aggressively purchasing market share.”79  The 
AMA also noted that the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of 
Justice had not taken actions against health care plans, despite the “tremendous 
consolidation” that has taken place.80  The AMA asserted that this was in stark 
contrast to the aggressive action taken against physicians in the form of 
 
 70. Id. 
 71. See AMA Statement, supra note 9, at 7 (“[T]ypical examples of egregious contract terms 
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antitrust investigations, evidencing what the AMA calls “a bias against 
physicians and in favor of payers.”81 
2. Arguments Against the Legislation 
Opponents of the Health Care Act are extremely skeptical of physicians’ 
arguments on behalf of patients and their promises to improve patient care.  
The American Association of Health Plans (“AAHP”), in its testimony before 
the House Judiciary Committee, stated that “[the Health Care Act] will benefit 
physicians, not consumers.”82  Indeed, opponents’ arguments focus on 
competition and the free market, and state that giving physicians 
“unprecedented collective bargaining rights” will only injure consumers, not 
protect patients.83 
Opponents repeatedly stressed the importance of the free market.  The 
AAHP stated that “vigorous enforcement of antitrust laws is crucial to preserve 
and ensure competition in the health care marketplace.”84  The AAHP 
challenged physicians’ assertions that health plans have dominant power, 
stating that there is “significant” competition among health plans.85  The 
AAHP stressed that it is aware of physicians who are guilty of anti-competitive 
behavior, stating that “a great deal of . . . anti-competitive conduct still occurs 
today and the antitrust enforcement agencies have devoted substantial 
resources to protecting consumers from it.”86  The AAHP asserted that 
“physicians do not need antitrust exemptions to address quality of care issues,” 
as health plans had “a variety of mechanisms in place that allow—and in fact 
encourage—physicians to contribute to efforts to improve quality of care.”87 
The government, through the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade 
Commission, echoed these “free market” arguments.88  Joel Klein, Assistant 
Attorney General and Head of the Antitrust Division, stated in testimony 
before Congress: 
As in other markets, the goal for health care markets should be to ensure that 
consumers benefit from a competitive marketplace where neither buyers nor 
sellers unlawfully exercise market power.  Policy should focus on ensuring that 
there is a competitive marketplace where neither health insurance plans nor 
 
 81. See AMA Statement, supra note 9, at 7. 
 82. The Quality Health Care Act of 1998, Hearings on H.R. 4277 Before the Comm. on the 
Judiciary House of Representatives, 105th Cong. 73-79 (1998) (statement of Steven J. 
Demontmollin, Vice President and General Counsel, Av-Med Health Plan, on behalf of the 
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 84. Id. at 78. 
 85. Id. 
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health care professionals are able to obtain or exercise market power to distort 
the competitive outcome . . . permitting providers to form bargaining groups in 
response to perceived bargaining leverage by insurers will not decrease the 
cost of health care or increase the quality of patient care.89 
Klein stressed that the Health Care Act would thus only serve to increase costs 
to consumers and the government.  He stated that “providers have their own 
self interests, and our enforcement actions and other experience suggest that 
their actions may not be congruent with the interests of consumers.”90  He 
concluded by stating: 
The better approach is to empower consumers by encouraging price 
competition . . . and ensuring effective antitrust enforcement both with regard 
to buyers (health insurance plans) and sellers (health care professionals) of 
provider services.  Competitive issues are best dealt with in a manner which 
promotes competition, not retards competition, as this bill would do if 
enacted.91 
Robert Pitofsky, Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission, supported 
these arguments and stated that “this extension of the labor exemption is being 
offered as a way to remedy matters that collective bargaining was never 
intended to address . . . collective bargaining rights are designed to raise the 
incomes and improve working conditions of union members.”92  He went on to 
state that patient care issues are important, but an “ill-fitting” labor exemption 
is not the right approach.93  He asserted that if physicians had collective 
bargaining rights, “we can expect prices for health care services to rise 
substantially.” 94 
The arguments for and against the Health Care Act shed considerable light 
on physicians’ position in the current health care crisis.  Because the physician 
culture does not encourage advocacy on their own behalf, and because 
physicians likely understand that such advocacy would not be well received, 
they center their argument for collective bargaining rights on concern for 
patients.  This sets physicians up for the easy attack that the legislation is really 
about protecting physicians.  Indeed, the AAHP’s arguments, furthered by the 
government, that the Health Care Act would lead to increased physician fees is 
probably correct.  Opponents stress that physicians’ incomes are simply high 
 
 89. The Quality Health Care Act of 1999: Hearings on H.R. 1304 Before the House 
Judiciary Comm., 106th Cong. 1 (June 22, 1999) (statement of Joel I. Klein). 
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 91. Id. 
 92. The Quality Health Care Act of 1998, Hearings on H.R. 4277 Before the Comm. on the 
Judiciary House of Representatives, 105th Cong. 73-79 (1998) (statement of Hon. Robert 
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enough.  They do not, however, explain why.95  This notion that physicians are 
fairly compensated and should not advocate on their own behalf provides a 
background for physician exploitation. 
The health care debate also highlights the fact that in many ways, 
physicians are caught in a game where the rules have changed dramatically.  
Physicians are not trained to view health care as simply another “good” or 
“service.”  For the physician, a career in medicine is a calling, not a job.  The 
delivery of health care involves moral and ethical complexities that do not 
surround the delivery of typical consumer goods and services.  Yet the 
opponents to collective bargaining do not speak in these terms.  Instead, they 
speak in the more comfortable terms of the market: we are dealing with 
“consumers,” not “patients,” and “providers,” or “sellers,” instead of 
“physicians.”96  The opponents have in many ways used this “market 
metaphor”97 to cast physicians as anti-competitive actors in what is supposed 
to be a free market for health care.  In our capitalist society, “free market” 
arguments are powerful.  This rhetoric provides the background for physician 
exploitation. 
IV. CAN PHYSICIANS STATE A MORAL CLAIM FOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
RIGHTS? 
A. Elements of Exploitation 
In considering whether physicians can state a moral claim to collective 
bargaining rights, it is important to explain the moral theory under which they 
might proceed.  In this case, theories of exploitation are instructive since such 
theories traditionally are at the root of drives to unionize.98  Moreover, 
“exploitation, or one of its legal analogues, increasingly forms a basis for 
social and legal policy determinations with respect to a wide range of issues.”99  
Exploitation can form the basis for a moral claim not simply to invalidate a 
 
 95. Opponents instead argue that physicians’ income and their “anti-competitive behavior” 
are in large part responsible for the current health care crisis, although studies show that this is 
not the case.  See Joseph P. Newhouse, Medical Care Costs: How Much Welfare Loss?, 6 J. OF 
ECON. PERSP. 3, 8 (1992) (“Those who emphasize supplier-induced demand as a factor in the 
expenditure increase argue that as physician supply has grown, physicians have increased demand 
to protect their incomes . . . . The evidence, however, does not offer much support to the view that 
supplier-induced demand is important in the rate of change.”). 
 96. See George J. Annas, J.D., M.H.P., Reframing the Debate on Health Care Reform by 
Replacing our Metaphors, reprinted in THREE REALMS OF MANAGED CARE, SOCIETAL, 
INSTITUTIONAL, INDIVIDUAL 68-69 (John W. Glaser & Ronald P. Hamel eds.,1997). 
 97. See id. at 67-69. 
 98. See JACK BARBASH, THE PRACTICE OF UNIONISM 407 (1956). 
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particular transaction, but, as Alan Wertheimer argues, to call attention “to the 
injustice or wrongness of the conditions under which it is rational for B to 
accept A’s proposal, and with arguing for the repair of those conditions.”100  
This is the case here, where physicians are not seeking legislation to invalidate 
their transactions with MCOs, but instead seek unionization to repair or 
restructure the “background conditions” under which the two sides deal. 
Wertheimer defines exploitation as a transaction where one party, A, takes 
unfair advantage of another party, B.101  This unfair advantage must result in a 
gain for A.102 Wertheimer further explains that a transaction is “unfair” where 
A’s benefit is excessive, relative to the benefit to B, or A “has been able to turn 
some characteristic of B or some feature of B’s situation to his or her 
advantage.”103  Wertheimer asserts that exploitation can take place even in 
“mutually advantageous” transactions where the exploitee, as well as the 
exploiter, gains something from the transaction.104  Exploitation may also be 
present where a transaction is seemingly consensual—that is, the exploitee 
appears to have given voluntary, informed consent.105 
At first glance, an exploitation claim by physicians would seem to lack 
merit.  Physicians, traditionally thought of as societal elites, do not fit the 
Marxist image of an exploited worker.  Admittedly, physicians receive some 
level of reimbursement from MCOs, and maintain some control over patient 
care.  Their salaries are substantially higher than those of typical blue-collar 
workers.  However, this does not mean necessarily that they cannot be 
exploited.  Using Wertheimer’s elements of exploitation, and viewing the case 
against managed care in the light most favorable to physicians, it is apparent 
that physicians could state a hypothetical exploitation claim against MCOs.  
MCOs in many cases do take unfair advantage of physicians.  MCOs both 
excessively benefit from their transactions with physicians and, most 
importantly, MCOs are currently able to turn characteristics of physicians’ 
situation to their own advantage. 
As described above, managed care has had significant effects on 
physicians’ working conditions and incomes.  As a result, an argument can be 
made that MCOs benefit excessively from their transactions with physicians, 
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relative to the benefit to physicians.  Through utilization review and other cost-
cutting strategies, MCOs are realizing at least some financial gains, due in 
large part to decreased reimbursements to physicians and the health plans’ own 
increasing market power.106 As noted by Simon and her co-writers: “Under 
traditional fee-for-service indemnity policies, most patients have been 
insulated from the true price of care because of the prevalence of 
comprehensive benefits and low co-payments and deductibles.  In contrast, 
managed-care plans realize the full amount of any cost savings.”107  This same 
study noted that in 1994, specialists in markets that had high levels of managed 
care penetration suffered a drop in earnings of nearly eleven percent.108  The 
study’s findings “suggest that the spread of managed care is significantly 
altering the relative compensation and employment of primary care and 
specialist physicians.”109  Thus, any benefit to physicians from their 
transactions with MCOs appears slight. 
In contrast, the earnings of MCO executives are on the rise.  A 1998 report 
noted that senior executives of the nation’s largest for-profit MCOs earned an 
average of two million dollars per year.110  One recent report found that “on 
average, CEO’s for HMO’s and other health care companies receive two-thirds 
more compensation than their counterparts in other industries.”111  The same 
report noted that salary increases for managed care executives such as chief 
marketing officers, chief financial officers, as well as chief executive officers, 
were greater than that for practicing physicians.  Indeed, employees at all 
levels of managed care organizations saw greater pay increases than physicians 
during the period 1996-2000.112  It is argued that such high salaries and 
generous bonus packages are justified by market principles—it is simply what 
 
 106. Managed care’s impact on providers is not limited to physicians.  For instance, the 
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is necessary to attract the best individuals.113  Yet many who make these 
arguments do not apply these same principles to physician compensation.  
Perhaps they do not have to.  Perhaps it is something  besides compensation 
that  attracts physicians to the practice of medicine.  If so, MCOs are able to 
exploit physicians by capitalizing on this “something else” and paying them 
less than a fair rate of return for their services.  Further, given physicians’ 
training, ethical obligations and potential liability, a legitimate claim can be 
made that it is they, and not exclusively MCOs, who should profit from the 
provision of health care. 
Second, and often most significant for physicians, are the benefits MCOs 
reap from having respected physicians as part of their plans, such as attracting 
and treating patients.  As Larson notes, because of the medical profession’s 
“devotion to human welfare,” it has accumulated “a massive capital of social 
credit.”114  In effect, MCOs are successfully trading on that social credit and 
the trust that the public puts in physicians, and they are using it for their own 
gain, whether in the form of profits, market power or reputation.115  Indeed, 
MCOs are exploiting physicians by reducing their social credit and are eroding 
their professionalism by using them as agents to ration care and not 
compensating them for it.  This exploitation is even more apparent given that 
physicians invest a great deal of time and resources in becoming physicians.  
Because of their specialized training and investment in becoming 
professionals, they cannot (and in some cases will not) easily leave the 
profession.116 
Finally, an argument can be made that excessive benefits to MCOs arise 
from their use of  “take-it-or leave-it” contracts.  First, most standard MCO 
contracts include provisions which penalize physicians if their utilization of 
medical services exceeds a predetermined level, regardless of whether the care 
provided was in fact medically necessary.117  Thus, “MCOs have significantly 
shifted the financial risk of treating patients to the physicians.”118  Second, 
MCO standard form contracts are unfair and excessively benefit MCOs 
because they often contain termination-without-cause provisions that “allow 
MCOs to deselect physicians at any time if profit-maximizing policies are not 
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followed.”119  The threat of deselection for most physicians is significant, 
given MCO’s market power.  Finally, MCO standard form contracts 
excessively benefit MCOs because most contain “hold harmless” clauses.120  
As the AMA stated: “No reasonable person would, unless compelled, accept a 
contract which allows one party to behave in ways that may not meet the 
standard of care in tort law, and then shifts liability for that conduct from the 
responsible party to the person accepting the contract.”121  At least one 
commentator has argued that given these clauses, MCO-physician contracts are 
contracts of adhesion, which MCOs are able to use to their advantage.  As 
such, it has been argued that such contracts are unfair and violate public 
policy.122  These features of the MCO-physician relationship supply the 
requisite “unfairness” to support a claim of physician exploitation. 
Physicians also can show the requisite unfairness to support an exploitation 
claim because MCOs are able to turn certain features of physicians’ role in our 
health care system to MCOs’ advantage.  These characteristics will be 
examined below. 
B. The “Free Market” for Health Care is Not Free at All 
As seen in the debate over the Health Care Act, one of the features of 
physicians’ situation used most skillfully by MCOs, with the full support of the 
government, are the “market imperfections” or “market failures” that led to an 
explosion of health care costs.123  By pointing a finger at physician salaries and 
utilization habits as indicia of inefficiency, MCOs are able to use the “market 
metaphor” to exploit physicians.  As George Annas argues: 
The market metaphor leads us to think about medicine in already familiar 
ways: emphasis is placed on efficiency, profit maximization, customer 
satisfaction, the ability to pay . . . and competitive models. The ideology of 
medicine is displaced by the ideology of the marketplace.124 
Yet the “free market” for health care, which the government and MCOs 
purport to defend and promote, is not so free at all.  The government is a major 
market participant, and numerous laws shape the way our health care system 
operates.  Upon closer examination, it is apparent that the competitive, “free 
market” health care system we now have is in many ways a system that works 
to protect government and corporate interests. 
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Cass Sunstein, in his book Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech,125 
makes a similar argument with respect to the First Amendment.  In arguing for 
a change in the jurisprudence of free speech, Sunstein proposes a “New Deal” 
for speech modeled on the New Deal of the Roosevelt Era.  Sunstein states that 
before the New Deal period, the Constitution “frequently prohibited the 
government from interfering with existing distributions or rights and 
entitlements.”126  The prevailing view was that government must be neutral 
and take a “laissez-faire” approach, and therefore, respect the existing 
distributions.127  New Deal reformers, Sunstein points out, argued that this 
“neutrality” was a fiction.  Sunstein states that the New Deal reformers’ view 
was that “people, rather than nature, had created economic markets and 
existing distributions.  Laws underlay markets and made them possible.  If they 
had good reasons for doing so, people might change those markets and existing 
distributions.”128  To illustrate the effect that people, and not nature, had on 
existing entitlements and distributions, Sunstein states that New Deal 
Reformers pointed out that legal rules, such as those involving property and 
contracts, had produced certain “entitlements.”129  Sunstein explains: 
Those rules specified who owned what and who could do what to whom.  All 
this was a creation of law.  The market system, so often described as the realm 
of purely voluntary interactions, was actually pervaded by law . . . what people 
had, in markets, was a function of the entitlements that the law conferred on 
them.  The notion of “laissez-faire” thus stood revealed as a conspicuous 
fiction.130 
This argument applies with equal force here.  The rhetoric of health care 
reform is centered mostly on solving the current crisis through enhanced 
competition and a “free market” approach.  Yet, proponents have not changed 
the existing legal framework that shapes our health care system—a framework 
that arguably exploits physicians.  As Annas argues: 
[T]he market metaphor is . . . a myth . . . .  The metaphor pretends there is such 
a thing as a free market in health insurance plans and that purchasers can and 
should be content with their choices . . . the reality is that American markets 
are highly regulated [and] major industries enjoy large public subsidies . . . .131 
Thus, far from unleashing efficiency-enhancing competition, the managed care 
“solution” in many ways has worked simply to further the interests of certain 
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powerful players in the health care system: the government and corporations 
which purchase health care coverage. 
The government’s involvement in the health care market is not simply 
through the laws it makes and enforces—it is a large purchaser of health care 
services through the Medicare and Medicaid programs.  Spending on health 
care has a significant impact on the federal budget.  In 1991, 14.3% of the 
federal budget went to health care.132  In 1996, Medicare and Medicaid 
programs paid between forty-five and fifty percent of personal health 
expenditures.133  At least one commentator has noted that “the self-interest of 
the public sector may be a real impediment to development of a fair and 
efficient supply-side cost sharing policy . . . . Governments do not simply set 
the rules of the game in health care, they are big players themselves.” 134 
Indeed, the government is not simply a major purchaser of health care; in 
many ways, it constructed the system that led to the “market inefficiencies,” 
which are frequently cited as justifying lower and lower reimbursements to, 
and more controls over, physicians.  For instance, the government, at a 
minimum, encouraged the current health insurance system where most 
employed, insured individuals receive their health insurance through their 
employer.135  Because health benefits are not taxable to the employee, the 
system provides corporations and their workers with generous tax subsidies.136  
This employer-based system is what many believe started the managed care 
revolution—employers did not want to continue paying high insurance 
premiums for their workers.137  As Rosenblatt notes: 
[T]he law provided two types of assistance to the managed care revolution. 
First, on the “demand” side of the . . . equation, ERISA . . . permitted 
employers to bypass . . . a provider-dominated insurance system in favor of 
self-funded plans that avoided provider-dominated fee structures and content 
rules . . . .  Second, the law aided the transformation to managed care from the 
supply side of the equation, as well . . . . U.S. market law favors vertical 
integration and the formation of a single large producer of goods and services 
[and] . . . the movement toward the formation of large companies selling 
discounted health services to unregulated corporate purchasers took off.138 
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In addition, reimbursement levels set by the government for the Medicare 
program are often the basis for an MCO’s determination of “reasonable” 
fees.139  As one commentator remarked, “while managed care may have its 
roots in populism, the model has flowered in the favorable climate created by 
the American approach toward deregulation and corporatization.”140 
C. Physicians Cannot Openly Advocate for Themselves 
A second feature of physicians’ situation, which MCOs use to gain an 
unfair advantage, is that physicians are limited in their ability to advocate for 
themselves.  As explained above, physicians have not advocated for collective 
bargaining rights on the basis that they are being exploited.  That they are not, 
however, is one reason why MCOs and the government are able to exploit 
them.  At first blush, this statement likely seems ridiculous.  It is widely known 
that the AMA is a very powerful lobbying organization.  Outside of the AMA, 
physician specialists have their own lobbying organizations.  Yet the physician 
unionization debate reveals that physicians are indeed limited in how and how 
much they can advocate for themselves by their ethics, by fear of malpractice 
liability and by an unsympathetic society. 
As a group, physicians take very seriously their ethical commitment to 
place patients’ needs first.  As Dr. Andrew Yacht recently stated: “[T]he needs 
of our patients must always come before our own desires and other 
responsibilities . . . . At a time when the needs of patients have become 
dangerously obscured by financial considerations, we need to do what we can 
to protect those for whom we have sworn to care.”141  As noted above, in 
arguing for unionization, physicians cast it as an issue of patient care.142  
Indeed, physicians seeking unionization have disavowed, as unethical, one of 
the primary tools used by unionized workers—strikes.143  Unlike other workers 
attempting to unionize, physicians’ ethics essentially require that they argue for 
improved patient care first and their own wages and working conditions second 
(if at all).  One physician has summed up the frustration physicians feel: 
[A]s a group we study more years, work longer hours, bear more crushing 
responsibilities, perform greater amounts of free service to our hospitals . . . 
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than any other group.  We must now proclaim our right to demand appropriate 
payment for all of this . . . .  [I]t is time we abandoned the canard that unselfish 
humanitarianism provides our only motivation.144 
The fact that many physicians so readily subvert their own interests to that of 
their patients makes them prime targets for exploitation at the hands of MCOs. 
Second, physicians cannot always take a stand for themselves by openly 
doing what is necessary to increase their reimbursements from MCOs, which 
would entail limiting care, because of their fiduciary duty to their patients.145  
The terms established by MCOs put physicians at financial risk if their patients 
utilize more than a pre-determined level of health care services such as 
referrals to specialists, emergency rooms or use of diagnostic tests, for 
example.  If physicians want to increase their incomes, and in some cases keep 
their practices solvent, they are required to keep utilization to a minimum—in 
effect, to ration care.146  Yet rationing care is not a part of physicians’ ethical 
code, nor is it a defense to a malpractice claim.147  Again, MCOs are therefore 
able to take unfair advantage of physicians because to some degree, physicians 
must provide services to patients, even if they will not get paid for it, to adhere 
to their code of ethics and avoid liability.148  Moreover, despite their calls for a 
free and competitive health care market, which is traditionally thought to 
require providing consumers with reliable and full information, MCOs do not 
fully disclose to plan members that rationing is a significant factor in coverage 
as well as treatment decisions.149  In effect, MCOs suggest to enrollees that 
they will provide a fee-for service level of care, while leaving the physician to 
bear much of the risk of delivering it. 
Finally, physicians cannot openly advocate for themselves because such 
advocacy does not fit our current health care paradigm.  We expect physicians 
 
 144. Phan, supra note 28, at 116 (citing G. BUDRYS, WHEN DOCTORS JOIN UNIONS 9 (1997)). 
 145. See Neade v. Portes, 710 N.E.2d 418, 424 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999); see also CURRAN, supra 
note 38, at 188. 
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scheme . . . .”  Id. 
 147. See id. at 2143 (holding a physician allegedly rationing care on behalf of HMO liable for 
malpractice).  Bedside rationing without full disclosure to the patient may in at least some states 
support a claim for breach of fiduciary duty.  See generally Neade, 710 N.E.2d at 427. 
 148. See Wickline v. California, 192 Cal. App. 3d 1630, 1643 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); see also 
American Medical Association Fundamental Elements of the Patient-Physician Relationship, 
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of a patient as long as further treatment is medically indicated, without giving the patient 
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 149. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2001] EXPLOITATION OF THE ELITE 229 
to be devoted to our welfare.  Attempts to increase their incomes or improve 
their working conditions are therefore viewed with suspicion, as the 
inappropriate self-interest of wealthy elites.  One commentator has stated that, 
with respect to managed care legislation, “the drafting of consumer protections 
is . . . readily hijacked by entrenched providers, who have their own interests at 
heart.”150  In discussing physician deselection, another commentator noted: 
Although deselection places physicians at personal risk, lawmakers are more 
likely to respond to the risks deselection poses to patients.  Unfortunately, this 
leaves concerned physicians with a paradox.  A promising argument against 
deselection requires physicians to take the self-deprecating position that fear 
and finance have so upset their fiduciary and ethical duty to their patients that 
they can no longer be trusted to provide competent health care.151 
Clearly, society is not receptive to pleas that physicians are not paid enough or 
have a difficult lifestyle.  Indeed, in discussing the Health Care Act, Thomas 
Greaney stated: 
The rationale for the labor exemption rests primarily on notions of assuring fair 
wages and preventing the exploitation of labor by owners of capital.  At 
bottom then, special treatment of labor is fundamentally premised on concepts 
of fairness and redistribution of wealth.  With physicians enjoying mean net 
incomes exceeding $200,000, income growth significantly higher than other 
sectors of the economy, and enormous educational subsidies, the case for 
parity of treatment is unconvincing.152 
Even assuming that Greaney is correct regarding physicians’ incomes, he is 
incorrect in implying that physicians are somehow per se unable to be 
exploited.  As Wertheimer states, exploitation can be present in mutually 
advantageous transactions.153  Moreover, in focusing on physicians’ incomes 
alone, Greaney and others do not go behind the numbers to explore the 
complex issues of the value of health care in our society, the proper 
distribution of income and the proper levels of risk to be borne by those who 
provide health care and health insurance.  To be sure, physicians are in many 
ways different from the traditional blue-collar worker—the vast difference in 
incomes being the most obvious.  Yet Greaney and others who focus on 
physician incomes may be missing the point.  Like the traditional exploited 
worker, physicians are increasingly disempowered in their workplace.  
Moreover, like the classical worker, paid just enough to subsist, we may have 
hit or possibly passed the point where physicians can no longer subsist as 
professionals given their sizeable investment in training, strict ethical 
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obligations and the threat of malpractice liability.  Whether we are in fact at 
that point, and whether for the greater good we want to stay there, is something 
that bears further discussion. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Our intuition tells us that physicians are elites, and therefore they cannot be 
exploited.  Relying on this intuition, we adopt policies which attempt to 
provide a health care system that gives first-quality care, at the lowest prices, 
delivered through a “free-market” system.  As the key gatekeepers to health 
care, physicians are thus caught in the middle.  Top-notch American health 
care costs money and for-profit MCOs must watch their bottom line.  
Rationing, therefore, is key.  The issue is, assuming we have decided that free-
market health care is the solution, how much should physicians have to 
sacrifice in the name of the greater capitalist good?  This piece recognizes that 
physicians have a legitimate claim that in the drive to reform health care 
should not be overlooked. 
 
